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MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE
In claiming that Commercial Carriers did not marshal the
evidence on the two findings of the Board it disputes, Mr. Judd
makes much of the "amazing" circumstance that Commercial Carriers
did not use any record cites to the Board's thirteen paragraphs
of factual findings. Actually, Commercial Carriers frequently
cites to these paragraphs, located at R. 50-1.

(Appellant's

Brief, pp. 3, 5, 8, 17). At any rate, Judge Allen's factual
findings are the same as the Board's (with two exceptions), and
Commercial Carriers simply chose to cite Judge Allen's Order
rather than the Board's when referring to particular factual
findings.

Thus, the substance of Paragraphs 1-5 and 13 of the

Board's findings of fact as adopted from Judge Allen is cited on
Page 3 of Commercial Carrier's brief; Paragraphs 6-8 and 10-11 on
Page 4; and Paragraph 12 on Page 5.

Commercial Carriers did not

fail to marshal the evidence merely because it did not
consistently cite to record pages covering the Board's Order when
cited pages of Judge Allen's Order contained the same
information.
Instead of a duty to cite superfluous record pages,
Commercial Carriers had a duty only to marshal evidence in
support of those factual findings it disputed.

Commercial

Carriers identified two such findings, that Mr. Judd checked his
truck after stopping in Fort Kearney, and that the fight arose
from efforts to protect his truck.

Regarding the first finding,

Mr. Judd points to a statement in the police report by his coworker Mr. Coyle that they checked their trucks some time before
the fight, while they were still in the bar.

(R. 295). There is

no other mention in the record to this effect; neither Mr. Judd
nor Mr. Coyle testified that they checked their trucks after
stopping in Fort Kearney.

(R. 110, 147-158).

Judge Allen

apparently did not feel such a finding was warranted after
observing the demeanor and credibility of Mr. Coyle at the
hearing.

Even if it were true that Mr. Judd checked his truck

early in the evening, this fact does nothing to demonstrate that
Mr. Judd was in the course of his employment when he was injured
hours later.
The more significant disputed factual finding is the Board's
inference that the fight arose from Mr. Judd's efforts to protect
his truck.

Commercial Carriers noted the difficulty of

marshalling evidence in support of this inference because the
Board did not explain how it was reached.

(Brief of Appellant,

p. 9). Nonetheless, after examining the entire record,
Commercial Carriers gathered the subsidiary facts the Board
conceivably might have relied upon in making its inference.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10 n.3, 12). It contrasted these few
facts with the ample evidence relied upon by Judge Allen in
making his opposite inference to show that the substantial weight
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of the evidence supported Judge Allen's inference.1

(Appellant's

Brief, pp.13-14).
Finally, Commercial Carriers does not question, as Mr. Judd
claims it does, that the Board is the ultimate fact finder.
Neither does it desire, as Mr. Judd claims it does, that this
Court ignore the Board's findings of fact; since Commercial
Carriers accepts all but two of the Board's findings of fact, it
would be self-destructive to urge their wholesale rejection.
Commercial Carriers simply disagrees with the Board's inference
that the fight arose from Mr. Judd's efforts to protect his
truck.

While the Board was the ultimate fact finder on this

inference, it still was obliged to support this inference with
substantial evidence and to explain its rejection of Judge
Allen's opposite inference.

It failed to do this, and Commercial

Carriers requests this Court to reinstate Judge Allen's inference
that the fight was personal because that inference is supported
by substantial evidence.
Commercial Carriers has met its burden of marshalling the
evidence on the two factual findings it disputes.

It met this

burden despite the Board's refusal to indicate why, based upon
the same subsidiary facts, it reached an opposite inference from
Judge Allen regarding the cause of the fight.

*Even though Mr. Judd claimed that Judge Allen's inference
was not justified, he still conceded that it was a "rational
opinion." (R. 37).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE BOARD'S
INFERENCE ON THE CAUSE OF THE FIGHT
BECAUSE IT IS UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE.
The Board's determination that Mr. Judd's injuries arose out
of his employment hinged upon its inference that the fight was
work-related and not personal.

Its "evidence" for this inference

consists of the conclusory statements that "the Board finds no
basis to conclude that Judd's beating was the outgrowth of a
dispute over the women at the bar"; "the fight resulted from Judd
and Coyle's efforts to keep the other men away from the trucks,"
The Board does not follow these bare statements with a summary of
the evidence that might sustain them, nor does it attempt to tie
them to any of the factual findings.
While the Board is the ultimate fact finder in workmens'
compensation cases, it cannot draw facts out of the air.

This

Court can reverse the Board if a key factual finding does not
derive from substantial evidence based upon the record as a
whole. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g).
A. Judge Allen's Inference That The Fight Was Personal Is
Sustained By The Weight Of Evidence.
Because the substantial evidence standard requires reviewing
courts to view the record as a whole, the findings of the hearing
examiner, an integral part of the record, must always be
considered.

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 607 P.2d
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807, 810 (Utah 1981).

The hearing examiner's findings become

more important to assessing substantial evidence in cases where
the Board rejects those findings because
evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial
when an impartial experienced examiner who has observed the
witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions
different from the Board's than when he has reached the same
conclusion.
Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Bd.. 340 U.S. 474, 496
(1951).
Consideration of Judge Allen's factual inference reveals its
close connection to the subsidiary facts.

As indicated in

Commercial Carriers' principal brief, Judge Allen's inference
that the fight was personal differs from the Board's contrary
finding since it draws on events occurring throughout the course
of the entire evening rather than just the events occurring after
Mr. Judd left the bar.2

Thus, the factual findings (also adopted

by the Board) that Mr. Judd drank heavily in the bar, asked two
women to join him and Mr. Coyle "to avoid the attentions of the
two other younger men," and stayed with the women until after the
bar closed, contribute to the ultimate inference that the fight
was personal.

If the Board's inference were accepted, these

2

Even if Mr. Judd's claim is to be believed that the
atmosphere between the two truck drivers and the two young
gentlemen with buck knives strapped to their waists (R. 296) was
initially "chatty" at the bar (Appellee's Brief, p. 13), the
events over the duration of the evening indicate that the
camaraderie became clouded by alcohol and women. The night
culminated in a hostile warning by Mr. Judd to stay away from all
trucks in the parking lot and a threatening chase into the field,
resulting in Mr. Judd's injuries.
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factual findings become irrelevant, and there was no reason for
the Board to reiterate them in its Order.

Judge Allen's

factual inference that the fight was personal is relevant to the
determination of substantial evidence.

His inference detracts

from the Board's unsubstantiated inference that the fight was
work-related because it is much more closely related to the
subsidiary facts he made and the Board adopted.
B. The Board's Failure to Explain Why It Rejected Judge
Allen's Inference And Substituted Its Own Prevents This Court
From A Meaningful Determination Of Whether Its Inference Was
Based on Substantial Evidence.
Balanced against Judge Allen's compelling inference that the
fight was personal are the Board's bald statements that the fight
was work-related.

This Court cannot assess if the Commission's

contrary inference is grounded in substantial evidence if it does
not know what evidence, if any, the Commission relied upon, or
the reasons for rejecting the evidence relied upon by Judge
Allen.

Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n., 821 P..2d 1, 6

(Utah App. 1991) (when agency does not disclose logic for
reaching particular factual finding, impossible to challenge
logic on review).
In Deschutes County v. Employment Division, 728 P.2d 950
(Or.App. 1986), the court recognized the difficulty in attempting
meaningful judicial review after the Employment Board adopted its
hearing examiner's findings of fact but reached a different
conclusion without explanation.

Observing that the Employment

Board must fully explain why the facts led to its conclusion for
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meaningful judicial review, the court ruled that the Board's
unsupported conclusion was not rationally related to its decision
to award the applicant benefits.

Id. at 952-3.

Similarly, the Commission in this case dismissed a crucial
factual inference of its hearing examiner but did not mention any
evidence for its inference, rendering the exercise of determining
substantial evidence futile.

See

Brock v. L.E.Myers Co,. 818

F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. den. 484 U.S. 989 (when an
administrative body reverses findings of fact of hearing
examiner, must state reasons for so doing or Commission's
contrary conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence)
(attached as "Addendum 9"); Beaty v. Minnesota Bd. of Teaching.
354 N.W.2d 466 (Minn. App. 1984) (decision of administrative
agency contradicting hearing examiner's decision arbitrary and
capricious without supportive evidence) (attached as "Addendum
10"); St. Vincent's Hospital v. Finley, 380 A.2d 1152 (N.J. App.
1977) (administrative determination which does not specifically
explain its rejection of a contrary finding of a hearing officer
is vulnerable on judicial review) (attached as "Addendum 11").
Although Commercial Carriers guessed what evidence the Board
might have considered in reaching its inference that the fight
was work-related for the sake of marshalling the evidence, it is
uncertain what evidence, if any, the Board actually considered or
whether the evidence was substantial.

On the other hand, Judge

Allen's supported inference that the fight was personal is
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relevant in assessing whether the Commission reversed that
inference with substantial evidence.

Because there is

substantial evidence to support Judge Allen's finding, Commercial
Carriers requests this Court to reinstate it.
POINT II
MR. JUDD'S FIGHT DID NOT ARISE IN
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT
OCCUR WITHIN THE TIME, SPACE AND WORK-RELATED BOUNDARIES
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
For an injury to arise in the course of one's employment, it
must fall within the time, space, and work-related boundaries of
employment.

(R. 54). The Board did not demonstrate that Mr.

Judd's injuries fell within any of these boundaries.
Mr. Judd was not within the time boundaries when the fight
occurred because his logbook indicates that he went off duty at
6:30 p.m. on the night he sustained his injuries. Moreover, even
if this Court accepts the Board's factual finding that he checked
his truck earlier that evening, he was still off duty when the
fight occurred several hours later.

He did not fall within the

space boundaries because he abandoned Commercial Carrier's
property, the truck, when he decided to chase the two men thirty
yards into a field.

His injuries were not work-related since

Commercial Carriers never authorized him to pursue vandals.
With the facts decidedly against him, Mr. Judd resorts to
inapposite caselaw in the hope of lending his position authority.
He cites

M&K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 189 P.2d 132 (Utah
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1948), for the proposition that an employee is injured in the
course of his employment if injured while rendering services he
was hired to do at the time and place authorized.

The crucial

distinction here is that Mr. Judd was not hired to fight over
women, nor was he hired to pursue supposed vandals thirty yards
into a field.

Commercial Carriers never authorized Mr. Judd to

deal with vandalism on his own, alcohol-induced terms, and he
acted outside his scope of employment in so doing.
Mr. Judd also touts Martinez v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd.,
544 P.2d 1350 (Cal. 1976), as a case with "strikingly similar
facts" to this case.

One striking difference is that the

applicant in Martinez prevailed on the emergency doctrine,
permitting employees in certain instances to receive benefits if
they are injured while protecting employer property on employer
premises in emergency situations. Mr. Judd has never raised this
doctrine before as a basis for benefits and cannot try to so
characterize his injury on appeal. At any rate, the applicant in
Martinez successfully asserted the emergency doctrine because the
court determined it was reasonable that he would try to prevent
theft of beer.

Id. at 152.

In this case, Commercial Carriers

had instructed Mr. Judd to call the police and then the company
in instances of vandalism.

(R. 132, 165-66).

It was not

reasonable for Mr. Judd instead to pursue the fleeing vandals
even though they were already "scared off."

(R. 25).

Additionally, it was not reasonable for Mr. Judd to pursue
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vandals in a claimed attempt to serve his employer when he had
placed himself off duty several hours before and was not
responsible for performing work activities.

Walls v. Industrial

Com'n. of Utah, 857 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah App. 1993) (employer
could not reasonably expect that employee would injure herself
because she engaged in unauthorized activities hours after she
went off duty).3
The Board incorrectly determined that Mr. Judd's injuries
arose within the time, space and work-related boundaries of his
employment merely because he was a truck driver on assignment who
checked his truck several hours before he got into a fight.
Thus, even if this Court determines that the Board's unexplained
inference regarding the cause of the fight was grounded in
substantial evidence, there is an alternate basis for reinstating
Judge Allen's Order.
POINT III
THE BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN GRANTING A REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME THAT VIOLATED PROCEDURAL AND
STATUTORY LAW.
Mr. Judd does not dispute that his "Motion for
Continence[sic] for Response to Appeal" failed to state cause for
Maintenance Management, Inc. v. Tinkle, 570 P.2d 840 (Colo.
App. 840), cited by Mr. Judd, provides that when an employer does
nothing more to direct his employee than set general work hours,
and the employer benefits from an employee's reasonable departure
from schedule, ensuing injuries arise out of the course of his
employment. As shown above, Mr. Judd's departure was not
reasonable, and Maintenance Management is not controlling here.
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an extension of time in violation of Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 6(b) and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l(9)•

Neither

does he dispute, as he cannot,4 that the Commission's granting of
his defective motion was erroneous.

Mr. Judd instead contends

that the Commission's error was harmless to Commercial Carriers.
Nonetheless, Commercial Carriers was substantially prejudiced by
the Commission's perfunctory extension of time without heeding
Rule 6(b) and §63-46b-l(9).
A. The Commission's Error Harmed and Prejudiced Commercial
Carriers Because It Led To A Changed Outcome of the Case.
Mr. Judd notes that §63-46b-16(4) and Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 61, require a tribunal's error to be harmful and
substantially prejudicial before this Court can grant relief.

He

acknowledges that an error is harmful and substantially
prejudicial if there is "a reasonable likelihood that the error
affected the outcome of the proceedings," yet does not attempt to
prove that the Commission's error in this case had nothing to do
with its subsequent reversal of Judge Allen's Order.5
4

Under the plain language of Rule 6(b) and §63-46B-l(9), the
Commission can only grant an extension of time if the applicant
shows good cause for the extension. See Holbrook v. Hodson, 466
P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1970) (court cannot extend time unless
conditions stated in Rule 6(b) are met).
5

Mr. Judd contends that Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah
1987), narrows the definition of substantial prejudice to being
"deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the
disputed issues by the jury." He concludes that substantial
prejudice did not occur here because the extension did not
prevent Commercial Carriers from presenting additional testimony
or adding to the record. (Brief of Appellee, p. 27). However,
the Ashton court's restricted definition of "substantial
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To the contrary, the Commission's disregard of the rules in
this case permitted its entertainment of Mr. Judd's ultimately
successful Motion for Review.

Had the Commission properly

treated Mr. Judd's defective motion for enlargement of time, it
would have rejected the request for failure to comply with Rule
6(b) and §63-46b-l(9).

Mr. Judd would not have been entitled to

agency review of Judge Allen's Order.

Instead, Mr. Judd received

an extra month to develop a case for reversal and the Commission
subsequently reversed Judge Allen's Order.
Commercial Carriers suffered additional prejudice because
the extension of time ran contrary to prior agency practice.

As

discussed in Commercial Carrier's principal brief and as further
developed below, the Commission has a practice of denying an
extension of time to file a motion for review when a party fails
to show good cause.

Its contrary act of granting an extension in

this case was arbitrary and prejudiced Commercial Carriers.

See

Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp.. 858 P.2d 1005, 1011 n.4 (Utah

prejudice" was particularly suited to the facts before it because
the plaintiff there had alleged substantial prejudice in the
court's exclusion of evidence at a jury trial. In the context of
an alleged harmful evidentiary error, the test for whether the
error affected the outcome of the case was whether the error
deprived the jury of evidence that was necessary for the jury's
consideration of the issues. The Commission's harmful error in
this case was not evidentiary in basis, so Ashton's specialized
definition is inapplicable. The definition of harmless error is
still an error "sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude
there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange,
817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted).
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App. 1993) (court's inconsistent interpretation of contractual
provision runs contrary to substantial justice under Rule 61).
Since the Commission's indifference to the rules in this
case resulted in an altered outcome, its error harmed and
prejudiced Commercial Carriers.
B. Mr. Judd Cannot Refute The Fact That The Commission's
Error Ran Contrary To Prior Agency Practice.
In Maverick Country Stores v.Industrial Comm'n., 860 P.2d
944 (Utah App. 1993), the Commission exercised its practice of
denying an extension of time to file a motion for review because
the party did not show good cause. Mr. Judd tries to distinguish
Maverick on the inconsequential factual difference that Maverick
had asked for an extension the day after the time limit expired.
However, the Commission did not deny the extension on that basis;
it denied the extension because Maverick failed to show good
cause.

Maverick, 860 P.2d at 950. The Commission recognized and

enforced the good cause requirement in Maverick but capriciously
ignored it in this case, warranting this Court's nullification of
Mr. Judd's untimely-filed Motion for Review under §63-46b16(4) (iii) .
As supposed support for his contention that it is actually
Commission practice to grant timely-filed requests for extensions
regardless of whether the extensions comply with the rules, Mr.
Judd cites Pease v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 694 P.2d 613
(Utah 1984), where the Commission treated a letter entitled
"Motion for Review" as a timely-filed request for extension of
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time.

Id. at 614.

Pease does nothing to establish that the

Commission has granted extensions of time without good cause
shown in prior instances and is not instructive.
The requirement that an applicant requesting enlargement of
time show good cause does not exist for an agency to disregard or
recognize it at whim.

The requirement is there to ensure that

applicants provide justification for delaying the finality of a
judgment.

In this case, Judge Allen entered a judgment which

would have become final the day after Mr. Judd filed his
defective request for enlargement of time. Mr. Judd asked for
more time to challenge the judgment without showing why he
deserved the extra time.

It is impossible to justify the

postponement of final judgment in this case because Mr. Judd
never bothered to explain the delay.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
Mr. Judd has been unable to defend the Board's faulty
decision on appeal.

The Board's determination that Mr. Judd's

late-night fight was caused by his employment lacks substantial
evidence.

Its position that the fight fell within time, space

and work-related boundaries even though he was off-duty, away
from company property, and in violation of company regulations is
similarly untenable.

Additionally, its arbitrary decision to

grant Mr. Judd's defective request for extension of time resulted
in a changed outcome of the case.
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For the above reasons,

Appellant Commercial Carriers requests that this Court reverse
the Board's Order and deny Appellee benefits.
DATED this cJolflL day of September, 1994.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

P,B<^
le Swensen
Julianne P. Blanch
Attorneys for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants Commercial
Carriers and Old Republic Insurance by first class mail, postage
prepaid, this *Z-Z* ^

day of September, 1994, to:

Eugene C. Miller, Jr.
Sykes & Vilos, P.C.
Attorneys for Applicant/Appellee
311 South State Street, #240
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ADDENDUM 9:
Brock v. L.E. Myers Co..
818 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1987)

1270

818 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ed, Judge Spiegel, the United States District Judge who denied the petitions for
habeas corpus, concluded that "a rational
trier of fact could have found the element
of intent present in this case" and could
rationally have found the petitioners "either guilty or not guilty." Judge Spiegel,
in my view, was right.
It is true that the crime—if it was a
crime—was not a particularly heinous one,
and the consequences of the conviction
were severe; Mr. Tipton has spent a substantial period of time in prison, and although Mr. Farr has not suffered that indignity, the felony conviction led to the loss
of his license to practice law. Judges can
readily sympathize with someone like Mr.
Farr, a certified member of "the company
of educated men and women," and the
temptation to be magnanimous here is hard
to resist. As Judge Spiegel's decision correctly intimates, however, our role is a very
limited one—and regardless of how we
might have preferred to see the case decided at the criminal trial level, our sympathies ought to be immaterial if the trial
record contains evidence on which a rational fact-finder could have concluded that the
petitioners were guilty. We are not a
court of first instance, and we are not even
an Ohio court of error; our sole function is
to determine whether the robbery convictions violated the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution. I can discern no such constitutional violation.

money or his employer's. That being so, I
am not prepared to say that the debt collector has a constitutionally mandated defense
if the debtor happens to occupy living quarters somewhere on the premises where he
works. If Mr. Tuccinardi had been a live-in
domestic servant—a handyman or gardner
occupying quarters at his employer's home,
for example—1 do not see why, as a matter
of law, the accident of his residence would
have justified a taking of the employer's
property. The facts of this case (which
none of us can interpret with the authority
of a trial judge who actually heard the
testimony, of course) do not strike me as
sufficiently different from those hypothesized to justify the conclusion that the
State of Ohio violated the Federal Constitution in convicting Messrs. Farr and Tipton
of robbery. 3 I would have affirmed the
denial of the writs.

If Mr. Tuccinardi had been a teller in a
bank or a cashier in a supermarket, and if
he had been confronted at his place of
employment by someone threatening to
"tear up" the place if he did not immediately make payment on a personal debt, surely
it would have been no defense to a charge
of robbery that the debt collector did not
care whether the debtor paid with his own
3.

I attach no significance to the fact that the
complaints by which the criminal proceedings
weie initiated wcic signed by Mr. Tuccinardi,
the man on the scene, rather than by his employer, of whose whereabouts we know nothing.
It was Mr. Tuccinardi who sent for the police,
and it was the police, according to their testimony at the probable cause hearing that resulted in
Mr. Fatr's being bound over foi the grand jury,
who took Mi. Tuccinaidi to the police station to
sign the complaints. There was no reason for
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Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission reversed an administraMr. O'Neil, the owner of the pony keg, to sign a
complaint after Mr. Tuccinardi had already
done so, and it is not inconceivable that Mr.
O'Neil (who was said to have owed Mr. Tuccinardi an indeterminate amount for ten days of
work performed over the preceeding two or
three weeks) could recoup his loss in any event
by deducting fifty dollars from Mr. Tuccmardi's
pay. No such recoupment could turn a robbery
into a loan after the fact, however.
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tive law judge's decision which had upheld
citations issued against employer. The
Secretary of Labor petitioned for review,
contending that Commission's decision was
not supported by substantial evidence and
did not adequately articulate reasons for
failing to credit findings of administrative
law judge. The Court of Appeals, Ralph B.
Guy, Jr., Circuit Judge, held that: (1) claim
of unforeseeable employee misconduct is
affirmative defense to be proved by employer after Secretary of Labor has made
out prima facie case of violation of Occupational Safety Health Act, and (2) Commission's conclusion, after Commission chose
to accept employer's evidence as to adequacy of its written safety program while selectively ignoring testimony which showed
that program in practice was not only ignored but actively disregarded, was not
supported by substantial evidence.
Reversed; petition granted.

and not on whether employee miscondu<
that of a foreman as opposed to an emp
ee. Occupational Safety and Health Ac
1970, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et

1. Labor Relations ®=»29
Claim of unforeseeable employee misconduct is affirmative defense to be proved
by employer after Secretary of Labor has
made out prima facie case of violation of
Occupational Safety Health Act; disagreeing with Capital Electric Line Builders of
Kansas v. Marshall, 678 F.2d 128 (10th
Cir.); Pennsylvania
Power and Light v.
OSHRC, 737 F.2d 350 (3d Cir.). Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2 et
seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.

6. Labor Relations <s=29
After Secretary of Labor makes
prima facie case, under Occupational ^
ty and Health Act, of employer's av
ness of intentionally preventable has
employer may defend citation on gr<
that, due to existence of thorough and
quate safety program which is comn
cated and enforced as written, conduc
employees in violating policy was idios
ratic and unforeseeable; employer
wishes to rely on presence of effe<
safety program to establish that it c
not reasonably have foreseen the aber
behavior of its employees must dei
strate that program's effectiveness in ]
tice as well as in theory. Occupat
Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2 et
29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.

2. Labor Relations <a=*29
In cases involving negligent behavior
by supervisor or foreman which results in
dangerous risk to employees under his or
her supervision, such fact raises inference
of lax enforcement and/or communication
of employer's safety policy, for purpose of
establishing violation of Occupational Safety and Health Act. Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.
3. Labor Relations <^29
Proper focus in employee misconduct
cases under Occupational Safety and
Health Act is on effectiveness of employer's implementation of its safety program,

4. Labor Relations ®=»9.6
Statutory duty to assure compli?
with standards issued under Occupati
Safety and Health Act includes obliga
to prevent hazardous noncomplying
duct by employees. Occupational Sa
and Health Act of 1970, § 2 et seq.
U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq.
5. Labor Relations <®=>29
Secretary of Labor makes out pi
facie case of employer's awareness of
tentially preventable hazard upon intro
tion of proof of employer's failure to
vide adequate safety equipment or to p
erly instruct its employees on neces
safety precautions. Occupational Sa
and Health Act of 1970, §§ 2 et seq., 5(
2), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651 et seq., 654(a)(l

7. Administrative Law and Proce
<®=>513
Labor Relations <s=>29
When Occupational Safety and H<
Review Commission reverses factual
ings of administrative law judge, who
unique opportunity of observing deme
of witnesses and accepting or reje<
their testimony based on those obs<
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tions, Commission must articulate reasons
for its failure to credit those findings. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,
§ 11(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 660(a).
8. Labor Relations <s^31
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission's conclusion, reversing
administrative law judge's decision which
had upheld citations against employer, was
not supported by substantial evidence;
Commission chose to accept employer's evidence as to adequacy of its written safety
program while selectively ignoring testimony which showed that program in practice
was not only ignored but actively disregarded. Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, § 11(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 660(a).

Sandra Lord (argued), Asst. Counsel for
Appellate Litigation, Office of the Sol., U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
John M. Kunst, Jr., Cincinnati, Ohio,
Gary E. Becker (argued), for respondents.

(OSHA) following the electrocution death
of one of Myers' employees. Following the
inspection, OSHA issued several citations
charging Myers with both serious and nonserious violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act). 29
U.S.C. § 651 et seq. However, the Secretary appeals only the Commission's ruling
with respect to the citation for "serious" '
violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a), and we
will confine our discussion to that issue
only. Section 1926.28(a) provides:
§ 1926.28 Personal protective equipment,
(a) The employer is responsible for requiring the wearing of appropriate personal protective equipment in all operations where there is an exposure to hazardous conditions or where this part indicates the need for using such equipment
to reduce the hazards to the employees.
The citation alleged that Myers had committed a serious violation by exposing employees working without safety belts or
other fall protection to a potential fall of 75
feet.

This action arises from an inspection conducted by a compliance officer of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

The investigation ensued as the result of
an accident in which one employee was
killed and another was seriously injured at
a construction project near Cincinnati operated by High Voltage Systems, a whollyowned division of Myers which constructs
and installs electrical transmission and distribution equipment. The project required
Myers' employees to install rubber covering as insulation on a 13.2 kilovolt energized electrical wire in a congested construction area where Emery Industries,
which had contracted with Myers to perform the insulation work, was building an
addition to a boiler house. The electrical
lines ran a distance of 85 feet between a
terminal pole and a tower located atop the
boiler house. The terminal pole was about
47 feet high, the roof of the boiler house
was about 60 feet from ground level, and
the top of the tower was about 80 feet
from the ground.

1. A serious violation is deemed to exist "if there
is a substantial probability that death or serious
physical harm could result from a condition
which exists, or from one or more practices,
means, methods, operations, or processes which

have been adopted or are in use, in such place
of employment unless the employe! did not, and
could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation."
29 U.S.C. § 666(k).

Before ENGEL and GUY, Circuit
Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge.
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge.
The Secretary of Labor petitions this
court for review of an order of the Occupational Safety* and Health Review Commission reversing the administrative law
judge's (ALJ) decision, which had upheld
citations issued against L.E. Myers Company (Myers). The Secretary contends that
the Commission's decision is not supported
by substantial evidence and did not adequately articulate its reasons for failing to
credit the findings of the ALL We agree
and hereby reverse.
I.
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Although the preferred method of performing this operation called for deadening
the high-voltage power lines, Emery refused to do so, whereupon James Kevelder,
Myers' district manager for the Cincinnati
area, consulted with Robert Sayre, a
Myers' foreman, about alternate methods
for performing the job. It was finally decided to attempt the job from the roof of
the boiler house building by standing a
ladder on the roof against the electrical
tower supporting the high-voltage wires
and having a man mount the ladder and
slide the rubber hose down onto the wires.
No mention was made of the use of any
specific protective equipment during this
discussion.
The foreman, Sayre, contacted James
Carmac, a journeyman lineman, and Russell Miller, an apprentice lineman, to perform the job. James Carmac testified before the ALJ that he had asked Sayre if
they needed to bring any tools or belts with
them, and Sayre said, "No, you don't need
nothing. All you need is a ladder that is in
a shed there at the substation." The work
commenced when Sayre, wearing no protective equipment other than rubber gloves,
mounted the 28 foot extension ladder on
the east side of the tower, and covered
most of the energized areas with rubber
blankets. He then took the rubber hose
which was handed up to him by Carmac,
who was standing on a lower rung of the
ladder, and began to slip it over the wires.
This procedure involved laying a section of
hose over the top channel of the tower
structure, reaching under the channel and
over a diagonal brace, and feeding the interlocking hose onto the line. As the
weight of the hose increased, Sayre decided
to balance the load by installing hose onto
the opposite side. He accordingly dismounted and the ladder was moved. Although it appears that the ladder may have
been "tied-off" while Sayre worked from it,
Carmac testified that when it was moved,
the rope was slack and it no longer appeared to be secured.
2.

Rubber sleeves fit over the worker's arms and
extend all the way to the shoulder area.
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At that point, Miller mounted the ladd
to continue the procedure from the wc
side of the tower as Sayre had previous
been doing. Although Miller was wearii
both rubber gloves as well as sleeve
none of the three men were wearing
safety belt or any other fall protecti
equipment. A bystander, the manager
another electrical construction firm wor
ing at the Emery site, testified at the hes
ing that observing Miller carrying out tr
procedure was "like watching a guy stru
gling on a tight rope, and we at that poi
were debating whether we should holler
the guy and tell him to get off the thing
Shortly after he began performing tl
work, Miller, without explanation or war
ing, fell forward and struck an uncover*
energized "pothead" or terminus for tl
power lines. He was instantly electrocu
ed, and continued falling until he struck t\
ground some 85 feet below.
Carma
standing on a lower ladder rung, fell bac
ward onto the roof, suffering broken ril
and other injuries. Sayre, who had bet
observing from a corner of the roof, WJ
unharmed.
Following investigation of the acciden
Myers determined that Sayre was subjei
to discipline for failing to require the use (
any fall protection equipment, such as saf
ty belts and lanyards. Use of such equi]
ment on the Emery project was mandate
by Myers own written safety booklet whic
is distributed to all supervisory personne
Sayre was placed on a two-week suspei
sion without pay, from which he never n
turned. 3
II.
Myers contested the citation for violatio
of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) on the groun
that the violation was not chargeable to th
company because it had a safety rule rt
quiring the use of safety belts while work
ing at elevated locations and, therefore, th
failure to use belts in this instance wa
unforseeable employee misconduct.
3. Sayre was not presented to testify at the hcai
ing and his current whereabouts are apparcntl
unknown.
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The evidence adduced at the hearing revealed a safety program at Myers which
looked good on paper but was routinely
disregarded in practice in the Cincinnati
district. The formal safety program consisted of: (1) distribution of safety manuals
to employees and supervisors, who were
required to sign and return a receipt for
the manuals; (2) regular safety "tailgate"
meetings which were to be conducted by
foremen at the worksite; (3) the filing of
reports on such meetings with the district
manager (here Kevelder); (4) individual
pre-job discussions of safety matters; (5)
worksite visits by a Myers Safety Supervisor, headquartered in Chicago, whose territory covered the eastern third of the country; and (6) a progressive system of discipline for safety infractions, normally implemented by the district manager. Myers
could produce no records showing receipt
by either Carmac or Miller of their basic
safety booklets nor for the manuals required for supervisory personnel, such as
Sayre and Kevelder. No records were produced of any tailgate meetings conducted
by Sayre, and Carmac reported that he
could not remember when a safety meeting
had last been held. Kevelder's secretary,
Nancy Maher, testified that, prior to the
accident, Sayre had not filed any safety
reports. Following Miller's death, Kenneth
Kesmeyer, HVS's manager out of Toledo,
demanded copies of Cincinnati's safety reports. Maher testified that Sayre repaired
to a backroom with some pens, a calendar,
and a copy of Myers "Tailgate Safety Meeting Guides" and prepared several reports
at once.
Kevelder testified that, as district manager, he did not get "actively involved" in
the safety program and that it was very
seldom necessary to have safety meetings
unless something was "really out of the
ordinary," although the company's Safety
Supervisor, Robert Grandt, testified that it
was the district managers who were responsible for training and enforcement of
safety matters within their districts. Kevelder further admitted that there had been
no specific discussion of safety matters prior to the Emery job at issue, mainly be•L
u u^ "mcnifinor TSavrp'sl intel-

ligence" to remind him to take normal safety precautions. However, as Carmac's testimony revealed, Sayre specifically stated
that no safety belts would be needed on the
job and, indeed, he himself did not have his
belt on nor did he tie-off while on the
ladder as protection against a potential fall.
Finally, OSHA's compliance officer testified that "The written program is a fairly
effective and thorough program. It is not
administered in that manner; therefore, I
rated the program as being ineffective."
The ALJ concluded that Myers "has
made an effort to institute and implement a
safety program of sorts. While this safety
program appears on its face to be a workable program, the circumstances surrounding the actions of foreman Sayre on the
day of the accident and prior thereto cast
serious doubt that the program was effective with respect to the crews he supervised." He credited testimony showing
that Sayre did not conduct tailgate safety
meetings as mandated and that he "may
have falsified reports in this regard." He
also relied on Cannae's testimony that
Sayre told him belts would not be needed
as evidence of the fact that Myers' safety
program "was not effectively communicated or enforced." Finally, he credited testimony by Kevelder's secretary and a union
representative to the effect that, shortly
after the accident, Kevelder stated that he
felt good linemen did not need safety belts
because they just "get in the way."
In reversing the findings of the ALJ, the
Commission concluded that Myers' safety
program was both adequate and effectively
communicated to its employees, relying primarily on testimony relative to the operation of the program as envisioned by the
Safety Director's Office. They cited the
compliance officer's testimony for the proposition that Myers' employee training program was not deficient, ignoring the rest
of his testimony to the effect that the manner in which it was actually carried out
rendered it ineffectual.
They further
found that "Sayre was a good supervisor"
despite the fact that there was testimony
presented regarding two incidents on prior
iobs which Sayre had supervised wherein
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Sayre's judgment and attention to safety
matters was called into question. No mention was made of the conflicting testimony
specifically credited by the ALJ. The Commission concluded that the Secretary failed
to sustain his burden of proving a violation
of § 1926.28(a) and vacated the citation.
III.
The Secretary raises two issues on appeal:
1) whether the Commission erred in
placing the burden of proof on the Secretary to establish that the employee misconduct was foreseeable to the employer,
and
2) whether the Commission's decision
is supported by substantial evidence
where it failed to articulate any reasons
for discrediting evidence relied on by the
ALJ and ignored evidence relative to the
actual enforcement and communication
of Myers' safety program to its employees.
We address these issues

seriatim.

A. The Burden of Proof.
The Occupational Safety and Health
Act's stated purpose is to provide "so far
as possible every working man and woman
in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions
" Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 12, 100 S.Ct. 883, 890, 63
L.Ed.2d 154 (1980). Its purpose is neither
punitive nor compensatory, but rather forward-looking; i.e., to prevent the first accident. Mineral Industries & Heavy Construction
Group, v. OSHRC, 639 F.2d
1289, 1294 (5th Cir.1981). To implement
the statutory purpose, Congress imposed
4. This court has held that "§ 1926.28(a) requires
an employer to require the wearing of appropriate safety equipment by his employees whenever a reasonably prudent employer, concerned
with the safety of his employees, would recognize the existence of a hazardous condition and
protect against that hazard by the means specified in the citation." Ray Evers Welding v. Occupational Safety, 625 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir.
1980). However, that case arose prior to the
Commission's invalidation of the disjunctive
version of the regulation.
5. § 1926.105 Safety nets.

dual obligations on employers to c(
both with a "general duty clause" r<
ing that the employer free the workpli
all
recognized
hazards,
29 1
§ 654(a)(1), and a "special duty cl
which requires compliance with mane
occupational safety and health star
issued by the Secretary, 29 1
§ 654(a)(2). In this case, Myers is ch
with a breach of the special duty clai
its violation of the standard set forth
C.F.R. § 1926.28(a). This standard
dates that an employer shall requii
wearing of appropriate personal prot
equipment in all situations where a
ployee is both exposed to a hazardou
dition and the need for such prot
equipment is indicated elsewhere ir
1926. Although the current version
standard uses the disjunctive "or" w
spect to these separate clauses, its oi
version used the conjunctive "and" t
cate that both conditions must be sal
The Commission held that the chai
"or" was invalidly promulgated by tl
retary and required reinstatement
prior interpretation mandating tha
conditions be met, and the Secreta
pressly declined to challenge that ru
appeal. Therefore, our analysis w
ceed by taking as a given that a viola
both parts of § 1926.28(a) must be p
Although Myers does not conte
facts that neither the foreman, Say
Carmac and Miller were wearing
belts, that such belts would have b<
propriate fall protection on the Erne
that risk of a fall was a recognized
attendant upon a job performed 1
ladder over 75 feet above ground \e\
that § 1926.105(a) 5 "indicates the
(a) Safety nets shall be provide
workplaces are more than 25 feet al
ground or water surface, or other
where the use of ladders, scaffolds, cs
forms, temporary floors, safety lines,
belts is impractical.
Although this standaid explicitly refer;
"Safety nets," the Commission as well a
courts of appeals have interpreted this
to include safety belts as well as the otl
items as appropriate means of fall pr
See Southern Colorado Prestress Co. v.
586 F.2d 1342, 1350 (10th Cir.1978); Bt
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for protective equipment where the "workplace is more than 25 feet above the
ground," 6 Myers nevertheless argues that
these facts are insufficient to prove the
Secretary's case. They contend that, since
it is clear that Congress did not intend
employers to be insurers against all accidents, but only those which are preventable, that when an employer alleges the
existence of a comprehensive safety program which renders noncompliance unforseeable, the Secretary carries the burden of
proving the insufficiency of that program.
We disagree.
[1] As Myers points out, there is a split
among the circuits with respect to this
question. Several circuits have held that
an allegation of unforseeable employee
misconduct constitutes an affirmative defense to be pleaded and proved by the
employer. See, e.g., Forging
Industry
Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 773 F.2d 1436,
1450 (4th Cir.1985) (en banc) (unforseeable
employee misconduct constitutes an affirmative defense);
Daniel
International
Corp. v. OSHRC, 683 F.2d 361, 363 (11th
Southern Contractors Service, 492 F.2d 498 (5th
Cir.1974).
6.

Myers puts forth an argument in this regard
that we must address. They contend that
§ 1926.105(a) should be read only to require an
employer to utilize either a safety net or any
other enumerated safety device—including a
"safety belt" or a "ladder." Therefore, they argue, since Myers undisputedly provided a ladder
upon which the involved employees could
stand, the ladder itself was sufficient fall protection and no other safety equipment was mandated.
The Commission itself has acknowledged that
§ 105(a) "is not satisfied simply by the use of
one of the devices listed in that section without
regard to whether such use provides adequate
fall protection to employees." National Indus.
Conductors, Inc., 90 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1871,
1872 (Rev.Comm'n 1981). See also Brock v.
LR. Willson <& Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1384
(D.C.Cir.1985) (device used must be capable of
providing protection against the type of hazard
to which employees are exposed). Moreover, in
its brief to the Commission, Myers specifically
conceded that safety belts should have been
used on this project.

7. Despite the Pennsylvania Power & Light
court's holding, it also stated that "[i]n cases
where the Secretary proves that a company supervisor had knowledge of, or participated in,

Cir.1982) (same); H.B. Zachry
Co. v.
OSHRC, 638 F.2d 812, 818-19 (5th Cir.
1981) (same); General Dynamics Corp. v.
OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 458 (1st Cir.1979)
(employer may defend by showing it took
all necessary precautions to prevent occurrence of violation); Danco
Construction
Co. v. OSHRC, 586 F.2d 1243, 1246 (8th
Cir. 1978) (employer bears burden of establishing affirmative defense of unforseeable
employee misconduct). Other circuits place
the burden of disproving unforseeable employee misconduct on the Secretary. See
Capital Electric Line Builders of Kansas
v. Marshall, 678 F.2d 128 (10th Cir.1982);
Pennsylvania
Power
and
Light
v.
OSHRC, 737 F.2d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1984)
(Secretary bears the burden of proving that
supervisor's failure to comply with standard was forseeable). 7 We are persuaded
that the appropriate resolution of this question is to regard a claim of unforseeable
employee misconduct as an affirmative defense to be proved by the employer after
the Secretary has made out a prima facie
case of a violation of the Act.
conduct violating the Act, we do not quarrel
with the logic of requiring the company to come
forward with some evidence that it has undertaken reasonable safety precautions." Moreover, we observe that the court's conclusion was
predicated on the presence of an adequate safety program and the unblemished safety record
of the involved supervisor.
We also observe that the Tenth Circuit has
itself issued a conflicting case in Austin Bldg.
Co. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir.1981).
In Austin, the court held:
The Secretary has the burden of showing that
the employer knew or, with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, could have known of the
likelihood of the noncomplying condition or
practice. The employer may defend by showing that the violation was an unforseeable
occurrence. Evidence that the employer effectively communicated and enforced safety
policies to protect against the hazard permits
an inference that the employer justifiably relied on its employees to comply with the applicable safety rules and that violations of
these safety policies were not forseeable or
preventable.
Id. at 1067-68 (emphasis added). See generally
Annotation, Employee Misconduct as Defense to
Citation, Issued Pursuant to O.S.H. Act, Arising
Out of Alleged Violation of Standards Resulting
in Death or Personal Injury of Employee, 59
A.L.R.Fed. 395 (1982).
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[2-5] In cases involving negligent behavior by a supervisor or foreman which
results in dangerous risks to employees
under his or her supervision, such fact raises an inference of lax enforcement and/or
communication of the employer's safety
policy. National Realty and
Construction Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257,
1267 n. 38 (D.C.Cir.1973). See also Donovan v. Capital City Excavating Co., Inc.,
712 F.2d 1008, 1010 (6th Cir.1983) (actions
of supervision are imputed to the company). However, the proper focus in employee misconduct cases is on the effectiveness
of the employer's implementation of its
safety program and not on whether the
employee misconduct is that of a foreman
as opposed to an employee. Congress has
specifically imposed on the employer the
"responsibility to assure compliance by his
own employees. Final responsibility for
compliance with the requirements of this
Act remains with the employers." S.Rep.
1282,91st Cong. 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 5177,
5182. The statutory duty to assure compliance with standards issued under the Act
includes the obligation to prevent hazardous noncomplying conduct by employees.
"[A]n instance of hazardous employee conduct may be considered preventable even if
no employer could have detected the conduct, or its hazardous character, at the
moment of its occurrence. Conceivably,
such conduct might have been precluded
through feasible precautions concerning
the hiring, training, and sanctioning of employees." National Realty, 489 F.2d at
1267 n. 37. Since the Act itself places upon
the employer the responsibility of taking
all reasonable steps to eradicate preventable hazards, "including imposing work
rules, communicating the rules to employees, and providing training, supervision and
disciplinary action designated to enforce
the rules," Forging Industries, 773 F.2d at
1450, the Secretary makes out a prima
facie case of the employer's awareness of a
potentially preventable hazard upon the introduction of proof of the employer's failure to provide adequate safety equipment
or to properly instruct its employees on
necessary safety precautions. See Bren-

nan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139, 1143 n.
(9th Cir.1975) ("Proof of an employer's fs
ure to provide guardrails, safety equ
ment, instructions, or the like, would esta
lish a prima facie case of an employe!
knowledge of its own acts of omission.
Danco Construction
Co. v. OSHRC, 5
F.2d at 1246 (employer may not "fail
properly train and supervise its employe
and then hide behind its lack of knowledj
concerning their dangerous working prz
tices.").
[6] Thereafter, an employer may d
fend the citation on the ground that, due
the existence of a thorough and adequa
safety program which is communicated ai
enforced as written, the conduct of its er
ployee(s) in violating that policy was idio
yncratic and unforseeable. By its natur
information with respect to the impleme
tation of its written safety program will 1
in the hands of the employer, and it is n<
unduly burdensome to require it to con
forward with such evidence. If the er
ployer's evidence preponderates, it has su
cessfully established the defense of unfo
seeable employee misconduct. We emph
size that the employer who wishes to rel
on the presence of an effective safety pr<
gram to establish that it could not reasoi
ably have foreseen the aberrant behavic
of its employees must demonstrate thj
program's effectiveness in practice as we
as in theory.
B.

Substantiality

of the

Evidence.

[7] Factual findings of the Commissio
are conclusive if supported by substantia
evidence in the record as a whole. 2
U.S.C. § 660(a). However, when the Conr
mission reverses the factual findings of th
ALJ, who had the unique opportunity o
observing the demeanor of the witnesse
and accepting or rejecting their testimon;
based on those observations, the Commis
sion must articulate reasons for its failun
to credit those findings. Citizens StaU
Bank v. FDIC, 718 F.2d 1440, 1444 (8tl
Cir.1983); Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting
Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1264 (4th Cir.1974
(administrative
agency
must
explair
grounds for rejection of ALJ's disposition)
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[8] In the case at bar, it is clear that
the Commission chose to accept Myers' evidence as to the adequacy of its written
safety program while selectively ignoring
testimony, credited by the ALJ, which
showed that the program in practice, at
least in Kevelder's district, and more specifically with respect to Sayre personally,
was not only ignored but actively disregarded.8 The Commission gave no reasons for its failure to accept the factual
findings made by the ALJ. Under these
circumstances, we do not find the Commission^ conclusion supported by substantial
evidence and it will therefore be REVERSED.
PETITION GRANTED.
(o
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SAGINAW MINING
COMPANY, Petitioner,
v.
Antonio MAZZULLI,
Respondent-Employee,

Cornelia G. Kennedy, Circuit Judge, held
that claimant for benefits under the Black
Lung Benefits Act must file with a deputy
commissioner, rather than an ALJ, a request for modification of an ALJ decision
regarding entitlement to benefits.
Vacated and remanded.
Administrative Law and Procedure <s=492
Labor Relations <s=*27
Claimant for benefits under the Black
Lung Benefits Act must file with a deputy
commissioner, rather than an ALJ, a request for modification of an ALJ decision
regarding entitlement to benefits. Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, § 401
et seq., 30 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, § 22, as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 922.
John G. Paleudis (argued), Hanlon, Duff
& Paleudis, Co., L.P.A., St. Clairsville,
Ohio, for petitioner.
Daniel A. Manring (argued), Columbus,
Ohio, Benefits Review Bd., Michael J. Denney, Thomas L. Holzman, Office of the
Solicitor, Ellen L. Beard (argued), U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for respondents.

and
The Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Respondent-Party in Interest.

Before KEITH, KENNEDY and
RYAN, Circuit Judges.

Employer sought review of order of
Benefits Review Board modifying a previous denial and awarding black lung benefits to employee. The Court of Appeals,

CORNELIA G. KENNEDY, Circuit
Judge.
Saginaw Mining Company ("Saginaw")
seeks review of an order of the Benefits
Review Board ("the Board") modifying a
previous denial and awarding black lung
benefits to respondent-employee Antonio
Mazzulli. Saginaw and the Director of the
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor
("Director"), respondent-party in interest,
contend that a claimant for benefits under
the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 901 et seq. ("BLBA"), must file a request

8. See, e.g., testimony establishing that, when
asked if belts or other special equipment would
be necessary, Sayre said "no". Further, Carmac
testified that after he saw what the job entailed,

he "would have put a lanyard on if I had one."
He had intentionally left his safety equipment at
his other job site in reliance on Sayre's assurance that it would not be necessary.

No. 86-3370.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Argued March 30, 1987.
Decided May 19, 1987.
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Mary Jo Beaty, Relator, v. Minnesota Board of Teaching, Respondent
Beaty v. Minnesota Bd. of Teaching
No. CX-83-1929
Court of Appeals of Minnesota
354N.W.2d466

August 21, 1984
PRIOR HISTORY:
Certiorari to Minnesota Board of Teching Court,
Reversed and remanded.
SYLLABUS: 1. The Minnesota Board of Teaching's
failure to apply equitable estoppel to the facts of this
case is an error of law.
2. The Minnesota Board of Teaching's decision to
deny appellant's application for school psychologist licensure is arbitrary and capricious.
COUNSEL: John R. Tunheim, 1700 First Bank Bldg,
St. Paul Minnesota 55101, for appellant.
Hubert H. Humphrey III Attorney General Darrell J
Davis, Spec. Asst 1100 Bremer Tower, 7th Place and
Minnesota St. St. Paul Minnesota 55101, for respondent.
JUDGES: Heard, considered and decided by Popovich,
Chief Judge, Leslie, Judge, and Crippen, Judge.
OPINIONBY: Popovich, C.J.
OPINION: [*468] POPOVICH, Chief Judge
This is an appeal from the order of the Minnesota
Board of Teaching denying appellant's application for
licensure as a School Psychologist I. Appellant claims
(1) the Board's failure to apply equitable estoppel was an
error of law, (2) the Board'd decision was arbitrary and
capricious, and (3) the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
Appellant has been employed for the past thirteen
years as a counselor at the Marshall Middle School in
Marshall, Minnesota. She has 20 years of experience in

education and is licensed in elementary education, elementary counseling, middle school guidance and counseling, secondary guidance and counseling, and middle
school health.
Appellant contacted Mankato State University
(Mankato) regarding obtaining school psychologist
training and on April 8, 1982, met with Dr. Ralph
Kudella, and advisor.
Kudella told appellant
Mankato's school psychology training program was
"pre-approved" and that official approval looked "very
promising". Appellant and Dr. Kudella compared
the transcript of appellant's coursework to the state
licensure requirements and developed a plan for
appellant to complete the requirements.
On April 12, 1982, appellant called the State
Department of Education and spoke with Kenneth
Peatross, Executive Secretary of the Minnesota Board
of Teaching (Board). Appellant inquired about the approval status of Mankato's school psychologist program.
Peatross responded that St. Cloud State University and
Mankato were competing to get approval for the school
psychologist program but that Mankato was way ahead
of St. Cloud. According to appellant, Peatross also
stated he was sure Mankato would get approval for its
program. Appellant testified she and Peatross discussed
the advisability of taking courses at Moorhead State
University rather than Mankato. According to appellant, Peatross stated it would be much easier to go to
Mankato since it is closer to Mashall than Moorhead
and it was "safe" to take school psychologist courses at
Mankato. Peatross testified he does not remember the
specifics of the conversation, but it had never been his
practice to advise completion of coursework in a program not yet approved.
In the summar of 1982, appellant attended Mankato
and completed three of the courses prescribed by Dr.
Kudella. During that same summer, Dr. Kudella de-
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signed a practicum for appellant. From August, 1982
through January, 1983, appellant completed [*469] the
practicum under the direction of Henry Hanck, a licensed School Psychologist I employed by the Marshall
School District.
In February of 1983, having completed the course
prescribed by Dr. Kudella, appellant contacted the
Department of Education (Department) to obtain application materials for licensure. She was referred to Dr.
Thomas Lombard, an Education Program Supervisor
with the Department of Education, who informed her
Mankato had dropped its plan to develop a school psychologist training program because of funding cutbacks.
On February 8, 1983, appellant requested the
Department review her qualifications. Dr. Lombard
called appellant after the review and told her she would
need to complete an additional six to nine courses to
meet the requirements for a School Psychologist I license. Appellant submitted an official application to the
Department of Education on February 23, 1983. She
informed Peatross she was willing to take the courses
required by Dr. Lombard and requested a list specifying
the required courses.
On March 7, 1983, George Droubie, Manager of
Personnel Licensing and Placement for the Department,
sent appellant notice of the denial of her licensing application. The notice evaluated appellant's coursework
and identified nine areas of graduate coursework appellant had not completed. Appellant asked the Department
to reconsider her application and submitted additional
information about her coursework. After reconsideration, Dr. Droubie informed appellant that based on the
additional information supplied by her, the Department
revised its evaluation of appellant's required coursework and found her work deficient in five subject areas.
Appellant enrolled in three of the prescribed courses, but
appealed the denial of her licensure, requesting a hearing pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 14.57 to 14.63 (1983).
On June 22, 1983, Peatross informed appellant that Dr.
Droubie's letter of April 21, 1983 was an offer of settlement and since appellant was continuing her appeal,
the offer was withdrawn and appellant was required to
start over in an approved program.
On June 28, 1983, a hearing was held before hearing
examiner Howard L. Kaibel. Following the hearing,
the hearing examiner issued findings of fact, conclusions of law and a memorandum recommending that the
Board order the Department to issue appellant a School
Psychologist I license upon successful completion of the
courses in which she was enrolled and the November
1983 Kaufman ABC Workshop.
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The hearing examiner found Dr. Droubie's letter of
April 21 was not a settlement offer and was admissible
evidence. He further found equitable estoppel should
be applied to prevent the Board from denying appellant a license after it had advised her to take courses at
Mankato and she had complied. Finally, the examiner
found the Board has discretionary authority to grant a
license to a "qualified" applicant even though the applicant's courses were completed in a program not approved
by the Department.
Executive Secretary of the Board Peatross filed exceptions with the Board: The exceptions included proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order.
On October 19, 1983, the Board heard oral arguments.
The Board rejected the hearing examiner's findings, conclusions and recommendation and adopted the findings,
conclusions and order proposed by the executive secretary. On December 5, 1983, appellant filed a petition
for writ of certiorari.
In March 1984, the Department asked appellant to submit information verifying she had completed any of the
five required subject areas. Appellant provided information which she contends verifies she completed all five
areas. The Department concluded appellant completed
only three of the five areas. The Department disputes
completion of "Theories of Personality" and "Practicum
in School Psychological Service".
[*470] ISSUES
1. Whether the Board's failure to apply equitable
estoppel was an error of law?
2. Whether the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously
in denying appellant's application for licensure?
3. Whether the Board's decision denying appellant's
application for licensure is supported by substantial evidence?
ANALYSIS
1. Judicial review of administrative agency decisions
is governed by the Minnesota Administrative Procedures
Act, Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (1982) which provides:
In a judicial review under sections 14.63 to 14.68, the
court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand
the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or
modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction
of the agency; or
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(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or

court also said:

(d) Affected by other error of law; or

The governmental-proprietary distinction, however,
does reflect a relevant concern: the danger that estoppel will hinder government and frustrate public policy.
The problem is that the distinction [*471] is not sufficiently calibrated to implement that concern in every situation. Thus, the instant inquiry should not be whether
the county's actions may be characterized as governmental or proprietary. Instead, the equities of the circumstances must be examined and the government estopped
if justice so requires, weighing in that determination the
public interest frustrated by the estoppel. . . . We do
not envision that estoppel will be freely applied against
the government. But if justice demands, estoppel can
be applied against the government even when it acted
in a sovereign capacity if the equities advanced by the
individual are sufficiently great.
Id. A balancing test is added to the general requirements
of equitable estoppel when the government is sought to
be estopped in its sovereign capacity.

(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the
entire record as submitted; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious.
Id.
Decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a presumption of correctness "and will be reversed only when
they reflect an error of law or when the findings are
arbitrary and capricious or are unsupported by substantial evidence." Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minnesota
Department of Natural Resources, 300N.W.2d769, 777
(Minn. 1981); see Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256
N.W.2d808, 824 (Minn. 1977). When reviewing questions of law, however, the court is not bound by the
agency's decision. Ekstedt v. Village of New Hope,
292 Minn. 152, 164, 193 N.W.2d 821, 829 (1972). It
is the function of the court in reviewing administrative
agency decisions to settle questions of law. State ex rel.
Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 240, 248,
32 N.W.2d 574, 580 (1948). Administrative agency
decisions which are quasi-judicial in nature are more
closely scrutinized than the quasi-legislative decisions
which recive an extremely limited review on appeal.
Arvig Telephone Co. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 270NW.2dlll,
116 (Minn. 1978).
2. Initially, we consider whether the Board's failure to
apply equitable estoppel was an error of law. For equitable estoppel, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant, through language or conduct, induced the plaintiff
to rely, in good faith, on this language or conduct to his
injury, detriment or prejudice. Ridgewood Development
Co. v. State, 294N.W.2d288, 292 (Minn. 1980).
Traditionally, courts relied on the distinction between
sovereign and proprietary activities in determining the
applicability of estoppel against government agencies.
Mesaba Aviation Division v. County of Itasca, 258
N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 1977). It had been the rule
that estoppel was available for use against government's
proprietary acts, but not available for use against its
sovereign or governmental acts. See State v. Horr, 165
Minn. 1, 4, 205 N.W. 444, 445 (1925). In Mesaba,
the Minnesota Supreme Court abandoned the distinction, stating:
Although the governmental-proprietary distinction
might once have been a progressive test of the proper
circumstances in which to stop the government, we no
longer find it a useful tool for that purpose. The distinction is difficult to apply and is to some extent misleading.
Mesaba, 258 N.W.2d at 880 (citations omitted). The

FYIS-NF Visits

In this matter, appellant spoke with Kenneth Peatross,
executive secretary of the Board, before pursuing the
courses prescribed by Dr. Kudella. Her conversation with Peatross left her with the definite impression
she would be able to fully complete the requirements
for School Psychologist I licensure through Mankato.
Pursuant to that belief, appellant expended a great deal
of time and money completing the courses outlined by
Dr. Kudella.
Whether an administrative officer is authorized to
make a representation is an important consideration
in determining whether the government should be
estopped. Mesaba, 258 N.W.2d at 879. Peatross is
the Executive Secretary of the Board of Teaching. The
Board has ultimate licensing authority and Peatross routinely handles licensure matters. Peatross was authorized to recommend a school where one could fulfill the
licensure requirements.
3. Equitable estoppel may also arise from communications regarding appellant's application for licensure and
appeal. In early 1983, Dr. Droubie and Dr. Lombard
agreed to review appellant's qualifications to determine
whether she might qualify for licensure. In his letter
of April 21, 1983, Dr. Droubie stated appellant could
meet the licensure requirements by completing five specific subject areas. Relying on this letter, appellant registered and completed four courses which satisfied three of
the five areas. She also supplied a written endorsement
certifying that she had completed a fourth requirement.
When appellant did not drop her appeal of the original license denial, the Board sought to characterize
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Droubie's April 21 letter as an offer of settlement. On
June 27, 1983, Peatross informed appellant the offer was
revoked and appellant was required to start over in an
approved program.
The Board erred by not applying equitable estoppel as
the hearing examiner recommended. In reliance on representations made by agents of the Board and Department
authorized to make such representations, appellant in
good faith expended a great deal of time and money pursuing a School Psychologist I license. The balancing test
of Mesaba has been met. Applying estoppel against the
government in this case will not frustrate any legitimate
public purpose, while failing to apply it will result in
great hardship to appellant. Justice demands the Board
be estopped from not ordering the Department to grant
appellant's application for licensure.
4. The Board's decision denying appellant's licensure
is also arbitrary and capricious. A decision of an administrative agency is arbitrary and capricious when the
determination represents the agency's will and not its
judgment, or when the decision is without evidence to
support its conclusion. Bryan v. Community State Bank
ofBloomington, 285Minn. 226, 234, 172N.W.2d771,
776 (1969).
(a) In his April 21 letter, Dr. Droubie stated appellant
could comply with the "Theories of Personalities" requirement if she obtained an endorsement from the chairperson of the psychology department at the University of
Minnesota, Duluth (UMD) indicating this requirement
had been met. Appellant obtained such an endorsement
[*472] from Dr. Gum of UMD. The Board, however,
now claims the endorsement is inadequate to satisfy the
requirement.
(b) The Board also maintains the practicum experience
appellant received under Mr. Hanck does not meet the
"Practicum in School Psychological Service" requirement because her work was not done under the supervision of a School Psychologist II. The Board cites no
rule, however, which requires the practicum be done
under a School Psychologist II. Even Minnesota Rule
8700.6310, subpart 4(G)(2) (1983), effective July 1,
1985, will not require supervision by a Level II school
psychologist, nl
nl Minnesota Rule 8700,6310,
4(G)(2)(1983) states in relevant part:

subpart

(2) . . . The practicum shall be done on at least
a half-time basis, and the principal supervision must
be provided by a practicing school psychologist. A
currently practicing school psychologist is defined
as a fully licensed person working at least half-time
in the practice of school psychology or the prepara-
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tion of school psychologists. Local supervision in a
practicum setting may be provided by other psychological personnel.
In his report, the hearing examiner found that
applicant's practicum was designed and ultimately supervised by [Dr. Kudella], a competent university professor with a doctorate. It was locally supervised by a
currently practicing school psychologist, fully licensed
at Level I who was specifically approved by the university professor. Licenses have been issued in the past to
applicants whose practicum was supervised locally by
level I psychologists. If Mankato had followed through
with its accreditation, as planned, there would be no
question as to the sufficiency of Applicant's practicum.
(c) Additionally, upon review of appellant's qualifications, the Department advised appellant she could meet
the licensure requirements by completing five subject
areas. Then shortly before the examiner's hearing, the
Board notified appellant this representation was only an
offer of settlement which was being withdrawn because
appellant continued with her appeal. Appellant had no
prior indication that the representation was an offer of
settlement. After withdrawing the so-called offer, the
Board informed appellant she would have to enroll in an
approved program and virtually start over.
(d) We are also troubled by the Board's total disregard
for the hearing examiner's report. The hearing examiner found appellant demonstrated good faith reliance
on representations made by the Executive Secretary of
the Department and she had essentially complied with
the requirements for licensure. He recommended appellant be licensed. The Board rejected the hearing examiner's findings without comment. Although agencies
are not bound by a hearing examiner's findings, City of
Moorhead v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission,
343 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1984), the hearing examiner's
findings should not be taken lightly. When an agency
rejects or significantly deviates from the hearing examiner's findings, it should explain, on the record, its
reasons for doing so. Failure to do so evidences the
agency's desire to exercise its will and not its judgment. A hearing examiner's report and recommendations should not be summarily rejected without reasons.
5. While this matter also presented the issue whether
the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence, in view of the preceding discussion and analysis
it is unnecessary to fully discuss this issue.
DECISION
In denying appellant's application for licensure, the
Minnesota Board of Teaching committed an error of law
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by failing to apply equitable estoppel. The Board's decision represented its will, not its judgment, and is arbitrary and capricious. We reverse and order the Board
u- to
* order
J the
A Department
^ -*. +ofcTiA
*• to
* •isof*TTeaching
Education

LEXSEE

sue a School Psychologist I license to Mary Jo Beaty,
appellant.
^
,
Reversed and remanded,
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ST. VINCENT'S HOSPITAL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOANNE E. FINLEY, COMMISSIONER,
AND HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION BOARD, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
ST. VINCENT'S HOSP. v. FINLEY
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division
154 N.J. Super. 24; 380 A.2d 1152

October 4, 1977, Argued

October 31, 1977, Decided
COUNSEL: Mr. Adrian M. Foley, Jr. argued the
cause for appellant (Messrs. McElroy, Connell, Foley
& Geiser, attorneys; Mr. E. Peter Connell on the brief).
Mr. Douglass L. Deny, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Mr. William F. Hyland,
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).
JUDGES: Bischoff, Kole and Gaulkin. The opinion of
the court was delivered by Gaulkin, J.S.C., Temporarily
Assigned.
OPINIONBY: GAULKIN
OPINION: [*26] [**1153] St. Vincent's Hospital
appeals from the denial of its application for a certificate of need by the Health Care Administration Board
(HCAB) in the New Jersey State Department of Health
(Department). N.J.S.A. 26:2H-7 et seq.
The procedural history of the application is long and
complex. St. Vincent's, a private Catholic "less than
full service" hospital of 112 beds operated in Montclair
since 1898, applied to the Department in May 1972 for
a certificate [*27] of need permitting it to relocate to a
200-bed full service hospital in West Caldwell. Before
that application was acted upon, and based upon informal
discussions with Department personnel, St. Vincent's
withdrew its application and in November 1973 filed
a new application for a certificate of need for a 100bed "less than full service" hospital in West Caldwell.
Sometime thereafter Montclair Community Hospital, a
122-bed hospital also located in Montclair, applied for
a certificate of need to relocate to a 200-bed facility in
that area of Essex County known as West Essex, where
West Caldwell lies.

In keeping with N.J.S.A. 26:2H-3 and 10, both St.
Vincent's and the Montclair Community applications
were submitted for review by the Hospital and Health
Planning Council of Metropolitan New Jersey (the "B"
agency), a comprehensive area-wide health planning
agency. N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2(g). In conjunction with that
review, the B agency initiated discussions between the
hospitals to determine whether a merger of institutions or
facilities might be effected. Those discussions proved
abortive since St. Vincent's contended that theological and philosophical differences between its Catholic
institution and the nonsectarian Montclair Community
were insurmountable. Thereupon, on March 27, 1974,
the B agency recommended that St. Vincent's be issued a certificate of need, giving as its essential reasons
that (1) the contemplated facility would yield an actual
decrease of 13 beds; [**1154] (2) the proposed lessthan-full care hospital would have an affiliation with St.
Joseph's Medical Center for special services and (3) the
estimated indebtedness of the hospital would be within
the guidelines promulgated by the Department. At the
same time, the B agency recommended denial of the
Montclair Community application.
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-10 and N.J.A.C. 8:332.4, the St. Vincent's application was forwarded for
review by the State Health Planning Council (the "A"
agency). N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2(f). While it was there pending, the [*28] then Acting Commissioner of Health pursued further merger discussions with St. Vincent's and
Montclair Community, again to no avail. On September
27, 1974 the A agency recommended denial of both
the St. Vincent's and the Montclair Community applications on grounds that Essex County was already
overbedded by 170 medical-surgical beds and that no
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need existed for two "acute general hospitals" in West
Essex. In recommending denial the A agency noted that
merger discussions had taken place and recommended
that the B agency and the Department of Health "work
together to insure a certificate of need that will best meet
the health care needs in the Montclair-West Essex area."
On October 7, 1974, following receipt of the recommendations of both the B and A agencies, the
Commissioner of Health recommended denial of the application on the same grounds relied upon by the A
agency. St. Vincent's sought reconsideration of this
recommendation, in part relying upon a then-existing
administrative regulation, N.J.A.C. 8:32-9.3(a):
* * * a project involving the replacement of an existing
facility shall not be subject to a bed need criterion by
service in the certificate of need review process in those
cases where the replacement facility proposes to replace
beds up to the rated capacity by service which existed in
the original facility.
The requests for reconsideration were forwarded by
the Department to the A agency, which on January
31, 1975 determined that under the regulation it could
not consider the bed need criterion in judging the St.
Vincent's application; it thereupon reversed its earlier determination and recommended approval of that
application. This recommendation was forwarded to
the Commissioner who once again attempted to initiate
merger discussions between St. Vincent's and Montclair
Community, which once again aborted. Again the
Commissioner recommended denial of the St. Vincent's
application, this time on the basis of a number of reasons
set forth in a letter addressed to St. Vincent's on April
24, 1975.
[*29] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-9 St. Vincent's
demanded a hearing. Following extensive hearings conducted between July 16, 1975 and February 11, 1976,
the hearing officer on June 24, 1976 rendered a lengthy
report which specifically addressed the reasons for denial
set forth in the Commissioner's April 24, 1975 letter.
The hearing officer found each of the reasons given by
the Commissioner unsupported by the record and therefore recommended that the HCAB approve St. Vincent's
application.
The HCAB considered the report of the hearing officer
at its meeting of August 5, 1976, and voted to deny the
St. Vincent's application. N.J.S.A. 26:2H-9. The reasons given by the HCAB were precisely those set forth
by the Commissioner in her April 24, 1975 letter, stated
in virtually the same language. At the request of St.
Vincent's the HCAB reviewed its decision after receiving copies of the documents introduced at the hearing,
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but on November 4, 1976 it determined not to revise its
conclusions. This appeal followed.
St. Vincent's advances four challenges to the HCAB
action: (1) that the HCAB based its denial "on facts
not reflected in the record" and failed to make adequate factual findings to support that denial; (2) that
at its August 5, 1976 meeting in which the denial was
voted, the HCAB improperly permitted the Department
to present witnesses, exhibits and argument and denied
St. Vincent's a similar opportunity; (3) that the denial
arose from the Department's effort to force a merger
between St. Vincent's and Montclair Community and
that it therefore unconstitutionally impairs St. Vincent's
freedom of religious expression, [**1155] and (4) that
the denial was voted "for patently arbitrary and unreasonable and capricious reasons."
We find ourselves unable to address the substantive issues presented, for we conclude that the findings of fact
and conclusions of law of the HCAB are insufficient for
review of the denial on the merits. Judicial review of
such an administrative decision requires our passing on
whether [*30] it is "supported by substantial credible evidence and is neither arbitrary nor capricious." Guerrero
v. Burlington Cty. Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 356
(1976). In order to consider those questions we must
have a clear statement from the administrative agency as
to the basis for its decision. Our Supreme Court stated
this principle succinctly in In re Plainfield-Union Water
Co., 11 N.J. 382(1953):
The courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless
they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review. The orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the grounds upon which
the administrative agency acted be "clearly disclosed
and adequately sustained." Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80, 63
S. Ct. 454, 87L. Ed. 626 (1943). "The administrative
process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise;"
judicial review demands that there be "clear indication"
that the administrative authority "has exercised the discretion" with which it has been endowed. Phelps Dodge
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 313
U.S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85 L. Ed. 1271, 133 A.L.R.
1217 (1941). It is in this wise that conformance to the
statutory standard of conduct can be secured, [at 396]

See also, Weston v. N.J. State Bd. of Optometrists, 32
N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1954).
These principles are set forth in statutory provisions
and administrative regulations as well. N.J.A.C. 8:3-
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3.1 provides that proceedings of the Department are
to be governed by the Administrative Procedure Act,
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq. Accordingly, upon the conclusion of the proceedings before him the hearing officer
was required to submit findings of fact and conclusions
of law. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). In making its determination the HCAB was required to limit its consideration
to the record made before the hearing officer (N.J.S.A.
52:14B-9; N.J.A.C. 8:43D-1.9), which record includes
the recommended report and decision of the hearing officer. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). In rendering its decision,
the HCAB was required to set forth its own "findings of
fact and conclusions of law, separately stated." N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10(d).
[*31] The reasons for denial by the HCAB of the St.
Vincent's application set forth in the August 16, 1976
letter fall far short of meeting the statutory requirement
of "findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately
stated." The reasons there given are precisely the same
as those given by the Commissioner in support of her
recommendation of denial on April 24, 1975, before the
hearing was even demanded. Thus, the record is entirely barren of any indication as to how, if at all, the
HCAB evaluated the proofs before the hearing officer or
his report and recommendations. Indeed, our review of
the transcript of the HCAB meeting of August 5, 1976
at which the denial was voted persuades us that no adequate evaluation was made by the HCAB of the record
before the hearing officer or his conclusions.
The Department urges that a culling of the record by
this court would disclose sufficient credible evidence
to support the HCAB findings and that they therefore
should be sustained. See Close v. Kordulak Bros.,
44 N.J. 589 (1965); Nat'l Nephrology Foundation v.
Dougherty, 138 N.J. Super. 470 (App. Div. 1976). But
the sufficiency of evidence "must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight"; the
test is not for the courts "to read only one side of the case
and, if they find any evidence there, the administrative
action is to be sustained and the record to the contrary
is to be ignored." Universal Camera Corp. [**1156]
v. Labor Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 481, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456,
461, 464, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951). Here the absence of
any statement by the HCAB as to how it weighed the
proofs before the hearing officer and his findings leaves
us without any guide to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence or the adequacy of its evaluation by the HCAB.
Cf. Weston v. N.J. State Bd. of Optometrists, supra.
In Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Bd., supra,
Justice Frankfurter cogently described why evaluation
of a hearing officer's conclusions is essential in determining whether a [*32] contrary agency conclusion is
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supported by sufficient evidence:
* * * evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial experienced examiner who has
observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn
conclusions different from the Board's than when he has
reached the same conclusion. The findings of the examiner are to be considered along with the consistency and
inherent probability of testimony. [340 U.S. at 496, 71
S. Ct. at 469]
The vulnerability of an administrative determination
which does not specifically explain its rejection of a contrary finding of a hearing officer has been discussed in
a number of recent cases. In Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. F.C.C., 143 US. App. DC. 383, 444 F. 2d
841 (DC. Cir. 1971), cert. den. 403 U.S. 923, 91 S.
Ct. 2229, 2233, 29 L Ed. 2d 701 (1971), reh. den.
404 U.S. 877, 92 S. Ct. 30, 30 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1971),
where the administrative agency had rejected the findings of a hearing examiner, Judge Leventhal discussed
both the court's review of the administrative determination and the manner in which the agency must evaluate
the findings of the examiner:
The function of the court is to assure that the agency has
given reasoned consideration to all the material facts and
issues. This calls for insistence that the agency articulate with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and
identify the significance of the crucial facts, a course
that tends to assure that the agency's policies effectuate general standards, applied without unreasonable discrimination.
* * *

The Examiner's decision is part of the record, and the
record must be considered as a whole in order to see
whether the result is supported by substantial evidence.
The agency's departures from the Examiner's findings
are vulnerable if they fail to reflect attentive consideration to the Examiner's decision. Yet in the last analysis
it is the agency's function, not the Examiner's, to make
the findings of fact and select the ultimate decision, and
where there is substantial evidence supporting each result it is the agency's choice that governs. Here, the
Commission accepted the Examiner's findings and conclusions to a substantial degree; and when it did not, the
Commission made clear not only its awareness of what
the [*33] Examiner had concluded, but also its reasons
for taking a different course. [143 US. App. D.C. at
393, 395, 444 F. 2d at 851, 853]
In Local No. 441, Int'l Bro. of Electrical Wkrs. v.
N.L.R.B., 167US. App. D.C. 53, 510F 2d 1274 (D.C.
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Cir. 1975), the court remanded for further findings a determination of the National Labor Relations Board which
rejected the conclusions of an administrative law judge,
stating the following reasons:
Assuming for discussion, that the Board intended to differ with the [administrative law judge] it was incumbent
upon the Board first to identify expressly an awareness
that it was disagreeing with the ALJ, especially on a
point where he had credited one witness over another,
and second, to set forth the basis of disagreement with
the ALJ so that we may determine whether the Board's
finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record
as a whole. [167 U.S. App. DC. at 55, 510 F. 2d at
1276]
See also, Alabama Ass1'n of Ins. A. v. Bd. of Gov. of
F.R. System, 533 F. 2d 224 (5 Cir. 1976); Brennan v.
Giles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F. 2d 1255 (4 Cir. 1974).
[**1157] For like reasons we find it necessary to
remand the matter for the HCAB to make "findings of
fact and conclusions of law, separately stated" (N.J.S.A.
52:14B-10(d)) with respect to the entire record, including the proofs before, and the report and recommendations of, the hearing examiner.
With respect to the proceedings on remand, we note
that the hearing officer found that the Department had
stipulated that "bed need was not a criterion in this case";
that by subsequent letter of June 1, 1976 the Department
took the position that "bed need is a proper element for
consideration," and that in the view of the hearing officer "it would be improper to consider it at this time."
The stipulation appears to have been made because of
N.J.A.C. 8:32-9.3, discussed above, which provided
that a replacement facility "shall not be subject to a bed
need criterion by service." That regulation was repealed
during the course of the hearings below. N.J.A.C. 8:331.1(c). Yet lack of bed need was [*34] recited as a
reason for denial in the letter of August 16, 1976.
Similarly, it appears that St. Vincent's presented
no proofs before the hearing examiner as to possible
merger of facilities or institutions in reliance upon a
July 23, 1974 letter from the Department advising that
the Commissioner had determined "that the merger of
your institution and Montclair Hospital will not be a
consideration in the determination of your request for
a Certificate of Need." The hearing officer accordingly
found that merger "was to be excluded as a topic" from
the hearing. The August 16, 1976 letter cites as another
reason for denial, however, that "comprehensive application" jointly with another institution "has not been
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adequately considered."
The statutory criteria for the issuance of a certificate
of need include consideration of "(a) the availability of
facilities or services which may serve as alternatives or
substitutes, (b) the need for special equipment and services in the area, and (c) the possible economies and
improvement in services to be anticipated from the operation of joint central services." N.J.S.A. 26:2H-8. In
view of this legislative mandate it would be inappropriate to require that on the remand the HCAB evaluate
the application without reference to such criteria. Cf.
Cooper River Convalescent Center v. Dougherty, 133
N.J. Super. 226, 233 (App. Div. 1975); Merry Heart
Nurs. and Conv. Home v. Dougherty, 131 N.J. Super.
412, 419 (App. Div. 1974). But it would be equally
inappropriate to permit the HCAB to utilize such criteria
without giving St. Vincent's the opportunity to present
evidence and argument bearing on them. See N.J.S.A.
52:14B-9; cf. In re Application of Union Community
Bank, 144 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1976).
Accordingly, on the remand both St. Vincent's and
the Department shall have the opportunity to supplement the record before the hearing officer with respect
to the issues of bed need and merger of facilities or
institutions. If either [*35] or both of the parties so
request, the HCAB shall remand the matter to the hearing officer for the purpose of supplementing the record
as to those issues, whereupon the hearing officer shall
file his supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of
law and his recommendations. The findings and conclusions required of the HCAB by our remand shall be based
upon the present record, as it may be thus supplemented.
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-9.
In order to avoid prolonging this already extended
proceeding, we fix the following time schedule: by
November 12, 1977 the parties shall advise the HCAB as
to whether they wish to supplement the record before the
hearing officer; if supplemental hearings are requested,
they shall be completed, and the hearing officer's report
filed, by January 16, 1978, and the HCAB shall render
its findings of fact and conclusions of law by February
17, 1978; if no supplemental hearings are requested, the
HCAB shall render its findings by December 15, 1977.
One further matter concerning the remand requires
comment. St. Vincent's contends that it was deprived
of a fair hearing before the HCAB because both the
Commissioner, an ex officio member of the [**1158]
HCAB, and Joseph Slavin, director of the B agency,
were permitted to make presentations to the Board while
representatives of St. Vincent's were prohibited from
doing so. We are not prepared to conclude from the
record before us that the HCAB permitted material be-
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yond the record to be presented to it; clearly the HCAB
may not expand the record without giving the applicant
the opportunity to participate and respond. N.J.S.A.
52:14B-9. But even in the absence of an expansion of
the record, in this unusual administrative setting where
the Commissioner, whose recommendation is the subject of the hearing, is herself a member of the reviewing
body, fairness in fact and appearance requires that the
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HCAB permit the applicant to respond appropriately to
any statement made by the Commissioner in support of
her recommendation. Cf. Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 NJ.
498 (1954); [*36] NJ. State Bd. of Optometrists v.
Nemitz, 21 NJ. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1952).
The denial of the certificate of need is reversed and the
matter is remanded to the HCAB for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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